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ABSTRACT
The third-party doctrine is a long-standing tenant of Fourth Amend-
ment law that allows law enforcement officers to utilize information
that was released to a third party without the probable cause required
for a traditional search warrant. This has allowed law enforcement
agents to use confidential informants, undercover agents, and access
bank records of suspected criminals. However, in a digital age where
exponentially more information is shared with Internet Service Provid-
ers, e-mail hosts, and social media “friends,” the traditional third-
party doctrine ideas allow law enforcement officers access to a cache
of personal information and data with a standard below probable
cause.
This Note explores particular issues that plague the traditional third-
party doctrine’s interactions with new technology and proposes a stan-
dard of voluntary disclosure for courts to use when determining if in-
formation falls under the purview of the third-party doctrine. The
factors in this proposed standard include the reasonable expectation of
privacy of the disclosing person, the frequency with which information
is disclosed, the purpose of disclosure, and the degree to which the
public can access the information.
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INTRODUCTION
“Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of ex-
ploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.”1 Justice Brandeis
wrote this statement in a dissenting opinion in 1928 for a case involving the
wiretapping of bootleggers. While science may not yet allow us to read
minds, advances in technology have made it possible to quickly and easily
share intimate details of one’s life with friends, family, and the world.
Advances in technology are also shaping how law enforcement officers
conduct investigations. This intersection of publicly shared information and
law enforcement techniques has long been ruled by the third-party doctrine,
which generally provides that information released to a third party loses its
Fourth Amendment protection, and can be obtained by law enforcement
without a search warrant.2
A commonly cited statute to support this idea is 18 U.S.C. § 2703,
which requires a court order supported by specific and articulable facts—a
standard lower than the probable cause required for a warrant3—to force
disclosure of stored wire and electronic communications.4 There is a pre-
sumption that warrantless searches are unconstitutional, but Fourth Amend-
ment cases have carved out certain exceptions to that rule.5 The release of
information to a third party is one such exception.
Some attorneys and legal scholars now push for the dissolution of this
doctrine. They assert the doctrine infringes Fourth Amendment rights given
advances in technology that require much more information to be released to
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928).
2. See Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561,
573–75 (2009).
3. See Erin Smith Dennis, Note, A Mosaic Shield: Maynard, the Fourth Amendment
and Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 757–58 (2011) (noting the
different standards for accessing information under various electronic communication stat-
utes); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163
U. PA. L. REV. 327, 380 (2015).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
5. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 332 (2006) (“Warrantless searches ‘are per se
unreasonable,’ ‘subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions.’”) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967)).
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third parties.6 However, the doctrine can be amended to both protect rights
and allow law enforcement officers to continue to use the valuable investiga-
tion tools that stem from this doctrine, including the use of confidential in-
formants and review of suspects’ bank records.7
The best way to balance these interests is for the doctrine to distinguish
information that citizens knowingly and voluntarily convey to third parties
from information that citizens may not know or even suspect they convey to
a third party but which is obtained by third parties in their normal course of
business. This proposed solution incorporates the reasonable expectation of
privacy test that has developed in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,8 while
remaining true to the original third-party doctrine that law enforcement of-
ficers have been relying on for decades.9
This Note outlines the history and development of the third-party doc-
trine, highlights incompatibilities between the traditional doctrine and new
technology, and proposes a solution using a voluntary disclosure standard. A
voluntary disclosure standard would allow law enforcement officers to seek
a court order, under statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 2703, only when the informa-
tion they are seeking was knowingly and voluntarily disclosed to a third
party.
Part I outlines the history and development of the third-party doctrine up
to and including Katz. Part II provides background on the expansion of the
third-party doctrine post-Katz and Part III addresses how the third-party doc-
trine should apply to new technology. The application of the third-party doc-
trinal standards to new technology has led to many criticisms of the doctrine,
and these criticisms are laid out in Part IV. Finally, Part V argues for a
voluntary disclosure standard, wherein law enforcement officers may seek a
court order, under statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 2703, only when the information
they are seeking was knowingly and voluntarily disclosed to a third party.
Access to invasive types of data that citizens do not actively and knowingly
6. RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, Cong. Research Serv., R43586, The Fourth Amendment
Third-Party Doctrine 12 (2014) (“While the third-party doctrine has been criticized by Mem-
bers of Congress, various commentators and others as overly constrictive of Americans’ pri-
vacy right . . . .”).
7. E.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
8. See infra Parts III and IV (describing the Katz case and the progression of cases
post-Katz).
9. This doctrine has allowed for the use of undercover agents, confidential informants
and pen registers—three major investigative tools. As evidence of the effect on third-party
electronic service providers now, it is worth noting that Apple and Google, two larger elec-
tronic communication providers, publish data on government requests. In 2013, Google re-
ceived 21,492 user data requests from the U.S. Government. GOOGLE, Google Transparency
Report, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/countries/?p=2013-06
(last visited Feb. 18, 2015). In the same year Apple received between 1,638 and 2,638 re-
quests, as they published the first half of 2013 in a range, instead of providing a specific
number. APPLE, Reports on Government Information Requests, https://www.apple.com/pri-
vacy/transparency-reports/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
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share (e.g., cell site location data, content of messages, and data from a car
computer) should require the same standard of probable cause needed to
obtain search warrants of houses, offices, and hard drives.10
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
The Justice Brandeis quote11 mentioned above originates in one of the
earliest third-party doctrine cases, Olmstead v. United States.12 That case
dealt with the wiretapping of suspected large-scale bootleggers. The wiretap-
ping did not require law enforcement to physically trespass on the defend-
ants’ property.13 The majority held that because there was no physical
trespass, the law enforcement officers had not conducted a search under the
Fourth Amendment, so the defendants’ Fourth Amendment claims were in-
valid.14 The court in Olmstead also reiterated the idea that information or
materials that are purposely shared with others, like calls over a telephone
wire that connect to a larger network, are not subject to the same protection
that one’s person or house merits.15
Beyond the glamorous profession of bootlegging, the third-party doc-
trine also developed around cases involving informants and undercover
agents.16 In one seminal case, involving Teamsters boss Jimmy Hoffa, the
Supreme Court held that revealing information to an informant (or “false
friend”) eliminates the expectation of privacy that a person has, and allows
that information to be brought before a court.17
Courts have additionally held that it is lawful for individuals wearing
recording equipment to converse with, or be within earshot of, a suspect.
This view stems from the idea that the recording equipment simply provides
10. The Container Doctrine applies to hard drives and mandates a search warrant for
law enforcement officers. See Saby Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting
the Third-Party Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, 13 FLA. COSTAL L. REV. 33, nn. 260–66
(2011).
11. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed
beliefs, thoughts and emotions.”).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 464–66 (emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment protects the search of mate-
rial things, like a man’s person, house, papers or effects and should not be read so liberally as
to include a man’s voice that is being projected along public wires).
15. Id. at 466 (“The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone
instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that
the wires beyond his house and messages while passing over them are not within the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.”).
16. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747 (1952).
17. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966).
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a better record of what someone could overhear.18 In many of these opinions,
the Supreme Court stressed that the concept of privacy corresponded to the
idea of physical trespass.19 The Court reasoned that informants or “false
friends” were not intruding on the suspect,20 and held that law enforcement
methods that intrude on suspects’ personal space, such as homes, offices,
and hotel rooms, are illegal.21
This line of cases was not without its critics on the bench, who pushed
for a broader interpretation of Fourth Amendment protection—one that held
the right to privacy protected more than just a person’s unshared thoughts.
Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead supported a more liberal interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment—one adaptive to the changing technology
that law enforcement used to gather information.22 Brandeis opined that the
Fourth Amendment should be read to protect “the right to be let alone—the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”23
Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in On Lee made reference to Justice Brandeis’
Olmstead dissent to express Frankfurter’s concerns about the technological
advances that allow for amplified government intrusion in citizens’ lives.24
Justice Brennan’s dissent in Lopez asserted that while it is not an undue
burden for citizens “to make damaging disclosures only to persons whose
character and motives may be trusted,” it is unreasonable to use an ines-
capable third party (such as an agent or a recording device) that cannot be
18. See On Lee, 343 U.S. at 753–54 (holding that it was lawful and not a trespass for a
customer of the suspect to enter the suspect’s business with the consent of the suspect and
engage the suspect in a conversation that was being recorded and listened to by a Bureau of
Narcotics agent, as “[p]etitioner was talking confidentially and indiscreetly with one he
trusted, and he was overheard. This was due to aid from a transmitter and receiver, to be sure,
but with the same effect on his privacy as if agent Lee had been eavesdropping outside an open
window.”); see also, Lopez, 373 U.S. at 439 (“[the device] neither saw nor heard more than the
agent itself.”). But c.f. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438 (“The Court has in the past sustained instances
of ‘electronic eavesdropping’ . . . when devices have been used to enable government agents to
overhear conversations which would have been beyond the reach of the human ear”).
19. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958–60 (2012) (describing the historical
jurisprudence as centered on a “trespass-based rule.”).
20. See On Lee, 343 U.S. at 751–52 (the wired informant “entered a place of business
with the consent, if not by the implied invitation of the petitioner.”).
21. See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 301 (“A hotel room can clearly be the object of Fourth
Amendment protection as much as a home or an office.” (internal citation omitted)); see also,
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509–11 (1961) (holding that the unauthorized physi-
cal invasion of a “spike mike” into the exterior of a defendant’s house did constitute an illegal
intrusion).
22. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(stating that at the time the Fourth Amendment was ratified, force and violence were the only
known means by which the Government could force self-incrimination).
23. Id. at 478 (also stating that it is immaterial where the connections to the telephone
wires were made, and whether a physical trespass occurred). This idea was also suggested in
an 1890 article penned by Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
24. On Lee, 343 U.S. at 759.
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shut out of a conversation the same way that a suspect and a trusted confi-
dant could simply walk away from a potential eavesdropper.25 Justice Bren-
nan additionally opined, “I believe that there is a grave danger of chilling all
private, free, and unconstrained communication,” and asserted that one as-
pect of a free society is that people should not have to watch every word as
carefully as these cases would require.26
Justice Brennan’s idea—that a person has the right to seek out a space to
have a private conversation with a trusted confidant without government in-
terference or recording—came to a head four years later in a case involving
an eavesdropping device placed outside of a phone booth.27 The Court in
Katz acknowledged that the trespass doctrine used in Olmstead and
Goldman v. United States28 had been so eroded by subsequent decisions, that
it was no longer sound footing for controlling law.29 The majority dismissed
the idea that the Fourth Amendment protects a general right to privacy.30
However, the majority departed from its previous characterization of the
Fourth Amendment as only protecting physical locations (like houses and
offices),31 by holding that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”32 Intangible interests, as well as tangible property, could be pro-
tected under the Fourth Amendment.
While the Katz opinion ushered the third-party doctrine into a new juris-
prudential framework, Katz is often cited for the test developed by Justice
Harlan in his concurrence.33 It is worth noting that Justice Harlan reads the
majority opinion not as doing away with the idea of “constitutionally pro-
tected areas”34 (such as houses and offices), but instead as adding to the list
of such protected areas.35 The two-part test, as stated by Harlan, determines
if a suspect is in a situation that warrants such constitutional protection.36
The test looks at (1) whether the suspect has demonstrated an actual (subjec-
25. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450 (1963). Brennan also cited Warren and
Brandeis’ article “The Right to Privacy,” supra note 23, in his dissent.
26. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 452.
27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). It is worth noting that in Katz, Brennan
joined with Justice Douglas’ concurrence expressing concern about the unchecked power of
the executive branch to conduct warrantless eavesdropping in matters of national security. See
id. at 359–60
28. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
30. Id. at 350 (stating that this protection is an area largely left to state law).
31. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966); Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 509–11 (1961).
32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
33. A LexisAdvance search for “Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test” returns
over 200 federal court opinions since the decision first came down.
34. This phrase is seen in Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 301.
35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (likening the phone booth to a home,
instead of a field, and adding places like closed phone booths, where there is an expectation of
privacy, to the list).
36. Id. at 361.
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tive) expectation of privacy and (2) whether society would deem that expec-
tation of privacy reasonable.37
This second prong of the Katz test has had the most influence on later
cases, so much so that it is often referred to in later decisions as the “Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy” test.38 However, the Katz majority and
the Harlan concurrence clearly established that a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy when information is knowingly disclosed to the pub-
lic.39 For example, a man in his office who knowingly projects information
to the public by yelling out a window has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in that information and can expect the government to acquire it. Con-
trast that example with a man in a public telephone booth who has taken care
to shut the door and shield his conversation from others. The latter person is
entitled to the assumption that his conversation remains private.
From this logic, one might think that people have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy when conversing with a trusted acquaintance. However, after
the Katz decision, the Court in United States v. White40 continued the logic
found in the earlier line of cases41 which held that people have no constitu-
tionally protected expectation that the person they are conversing with will
not share that information with law enforcement. So while the Katz decision
is significant to Fourth Amendment cases in general, and marks the Court’s
acceptance of a possible “right to privacy,” the third-party doctrine jurispru-
dence did not immediately change in response to it.
II. EXPANSION OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
In 1976, the third-party doctrine reached beyond conversations and
voice recordings by opening up documents to government acquisition in
United States v. Miller.42 In that case, the government investigated Miller for
his possible involvement in an illegal whiskey distillery and subpoenaed his
bank records, including checks, deposit slips and account statements kept in
the bank’s ordinary course of business.43 Miller argued that he had a reason-
able expectation that his bank documents were being kept and maintained
37. Id.
38. See supra note 33. And while this prong is where much of the action takes place, the
first prong has developed the “abandonment theory,” when a defendant abandons a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their property. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 689 F.3d 301,
306–07 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing that law enforcement can search an abandoned house that is
essentially open to the public and frequently vandalized).
39. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“objects, activi-
ties, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because
no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.”).
40. 401 U.S. 745, 754 (1971).
41. See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
42. 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976).
43. Id. at 437–38.
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for a specific purpose, and would be protected as if they were copies of his
personal records, made available to the bank for this limited purpose.44 How-
ever, Justice Powell distinguished the documents kept in the bank’s normal
course of business from “private papers” that would merit protection under
the trespass theory of protection, as the defendant neither owned nor pos-
sessed the business records.45
In his second argument, Justice Powell drew from the third-party doc-
trine46 and the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test to assert that
Miller lost protection under the Fourth Amendment when he knowingly ex-
posed information to the public by doing business with the bank and volun-
tarily conveying the checks and deposit slips to the bank.47 Like the
informants and agents in earlier cases, the bank was a party to these transac-
tions and its customers had no expectation that it would not share this infor-
mation with the government.48 Justice Powell pointed to the Bank Secrecy
Act, which requires bank records to be maintained because of their useful-
ness (especially in criminal matters), as proof that bank customers have no
legitimate expectation of privacy.49
After Miller, the Court affirmed this logic in Couch50 and Smith.51 The
former case dealt with documents in the possession of an accountant, and
held that there was no expectation of privacy in those documents.52 In the
latter case, a phone company placed a pen register on a customer’s phone, at
the request of police. This practice was also upheld under the third-party
doctrine.53 The Court began by distinguishing the lists of phone numbers
received in Smith from electronic eavesdropping on actual conversation in
Katz, and made an important content/non-content distinction that continues
in the third-party doctrine cases today.54 Writing for the majority in Smith,
Justice Blackmun observed that phone companies notify customers that they
44. Id. at 442.
45. Id. at 440. It is worth noting that Harlan’s concurrence in Katz is not the end of the
physical trespass concept of the Fourth Amendment. In fact, Justice Scalia in a later case states
explicitly that the Katz test serves to supplement the trespass theory—not replace it. See
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012).
46. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (citing Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293, and Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963)).
47. Id. at 441–43 (“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”).
48. Id. at 440–41.
49. Id. 442–43.
50. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (holding that there is no expectation of
privacy when documents are given to accountants).
51. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that a pen register, placed by the
phone company, identifying phone numbers was protected by the third-party doctrine).
52. Couch, 409 U.S. 322.
53. Smith, 442 U.S. 735.
54. Id. at 741 (reiterating that a pen register does not record a call or even hear a call,
but rather discloses the number dialed); see also THOMPSON II, supra note 6, at 12. (the old 51)
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can report harassing or annoying callers.55 This, the Court argued, makes it
too much to believe that any reasonable subscriber would consider the num-
bers he dialed to remain a secret.56 Even if the customer had a subjective
expectation of privacy (the first prong of the Katz test), it was not a reasona-
ble expectation.57 Like in the Miller case, the Smith court held that widely
known company practices shape what may reasonably be expected to be
private.58
The Smith Court also made an automation argument that recurs in later
third-party doctrine cases and academic writings.59 Justice Powell wrote that
the switching equipment used by phone companies is simply a modern ver-
sion of an operator—a third party capable of sharing information with the
government, like a bank teller.60 Powell also noted that customers (or depos-
itors in the case of Miller) “assum[e] the risk of disclosure.”61 This “assump-
tion of risk” argument is also frequently cited to support the third-party
doctrine.62 That argument supports the use of voluntary disclosure as the
standard, since the assumption of risk argument is based on individuals as-
suming the risk of exposure when they release information of one’s own
volition. The argument is laden with several assumptions: that customers (1)
know information is being released, (2) realize there is a risk of it being
revealed, and (3) are willing to take that risk because of the benefit they get
from releasing the information.
III. APPLYING THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE TO NEW TECHNOLOGY
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Protection
Act (ECPA), which was designed to prohibit government access to certain
electronic communications.63 However, the Act ended up creating major ex-
55. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43.
56. Id. at 743–44.
57. Id. at 742 (“First, we doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial.”).
58. Id. at 743.
59. See, eg., Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 581 (2011); see also infra notes 136–37.
60. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45.
61. Id. at 744.
62. See THOMPSON II, supra note 6, at 19; see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443 (1976); but cf., Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing this idea,
suggesting that people cannot assume the risk when they have no practical alternatives).
63. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in various sections of 18 U.S.C.); see also Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act: Hearing on H.R. 3378 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1–2 (1986) (statement of
Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, S. Comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin-
istration of Justice) (“Congress needs to act to ensure that the new technological equivalents of
telephone calls, telegrams and mail are afforded the same protection provided to conventional
communications.”).
410 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 21:401
emptions, prompting calls for change in the third-party doctrine.64 Three
parts of ECPA are most directly implicated in third-party cases: The Wiretap
Act65 expanded restrictions on government wiretaps on phones to electronic
computer transmissions;66 the Stored Communications Act (SCA) was in-
tended to protect communications stored electronically, such as e-mails on
Internet Service Provider (ISP) servers;67 and the Pen Register statute cre-
ated the requirement of a court order for the disclosure of pen registers to
law enforcement, and limited the ability of the government to access the
content of such communications.68
As discussed in the above-section, the content/non-content distinction
first arose in third-party cases.69 ECPA went on to codify that distinction,
making it permanent and influential on the development of later cases. With
the SCA and pen register statutes, Congress intended to protect individuals’
electronic information, and it intended to do so in a broad manner that would
allow the statute to adapt to quickly changing technology.70 One way Con-
gress did this was by requiring a court order with a standard of “specific and
articulable facts”71 for information that had previously required no such or-
der. However, the “specific and articulable facts” standard is lower than the
probable cause standard required to support a search warrant.72 This lower
standard has caused much of the pushback against the third-party doctrine,
especially as more and more information is released to third parties (espe-
cially ISPs) on a daily basis.73
However, despite being relatively newly enacted by Congress, these
statutes do not specifically address many of the new technologies that have
emerged in recent years. For example, wireless service providers record
when a cell phone connects with specific phone towers—essentially pin-
pointing the travel of the phone holder. Courts are split on whether law en-
forcement officers can obtain these records from wireless providers without
64. See Evan Peters, The Technology We Exalt Today Is Everyman’s Master, 44 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 103, 120–22 (2014); see also Dennis, supra note 3, at 754–59.
65. Peters, supra note 64, at 132; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
66. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
67. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12 (2014); see also, Alexander Scolnik, Protections for Elec-
tronic Communications: The Stored Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 375 (2009).
68. See Dennis, supra note 3, at 757–58; see also, Ghoshray, supra note 10, at n.22.
69. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
70. See Scolnik, supra note 67, at 374 (citing to 132 CONG. REC. 14,885 (1986)).
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
72. See Scolnik, supra note 67, at 375–77.
73. See Dennis, supra note 3, at 755–56 (noting that information that law enforcement
can monitor in real time under the Pen Register Statute includes all information in e-mail
headers, including e-mail addresses, timestamps, and IP addresses.).
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a warrant.74 Cell site location data is one of the most hotly contested areas of
the third-party doctrine right now.
While grappling with adapting precedent to new technology, courts have
used some creative solutions—like the automation rationale previously men-
tioned—to either fit new technology into old standards, or develop new tests
to determine the reasonable expectation standard of Katz. The D.C. Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Maynard75 gives courts a unique basis upon
which to strike down the intensive monitoring seen in earlier cases, Karo
and Knotts,76 without using the automation rationale. In Maynard,77 the court
adapted the mosaic theory—an idea that originated in Freedom of Informa-
tion Act cases—and applied it to the Fourth Amendment.78 Mosaic theory
posits that while one discrete piece of information, like a car’s location in a
public place at one particular time, is not a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment, a GPS tracker identifying a car’s location in public over the span of
weeks creates a picture far more revealing and intimate than what could be
drawn from basic, warrantless surveillance techniques.79 Patterns and more
personal information can be identified from the combination of such exten-
sive information revealing such personal details as frequently visited houses
of religion, multiple trips to the headquarters of a political party, or regular
visits to a lover’s house—information the court held should be protected by
a warrant.80
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari for Maynard in United
States v. Jones, a 2012 case dealing with a GPS tracker placed on a car.81
While the justices returned a unanimous decision affirming the D.C. Circuit,
they were split on the logic. Justice Scalia authored the opinion (joined by
Justices Roberts, Kennedy, and Thomas), Justice Sotomayor wrote an inde-
pendent concurrence, and Justice Alito (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer
and Kagan) also authored a concurrence. The plurality’s opinion, written by
Justice Scalia, is premised on the older, pre-Katz idea of trespass on the
74. See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n
Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t., 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010); see also In re Application of
U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013); but c.f. Davis v. United States,
754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014).
75. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
76. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); see also United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276 (1983). Both cases dealt with tracking devices that their respective Courts held
became unconstitutional once government agents began reviewing the tracking information,
similar to the human observation/automation distinction mentioned. So while the placement of
the device was constitutional, actually using the tracking device for its intended purpose—to
track—caused law enforcement officers’ actions to run afoul of the constitution.
77. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.
78. See Dennis, supra note 3, at 737, 754–59.
79. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 544.
80. Id. at 562.
81. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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defendant’s vehicle.82 Law enforcement agents installed the GPS tracker one
calendar day after the warrant’s established timeframe, and the tracker was
installed while the car was in Maryland—not the District of Columbia, as
specified in the warrant.83 The majority of justices decided the case based on
the warrantless physical intrusion of the tracker.84 Scalia addressed the argu-
ment that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test ended the previous
line of physical trespass cases, and instead clarified that the Katz test simply
expanded the common law trespass test to accommodate for technology that
could invade formerly private conversations.85
Just as Justice Harlan’s concurrence is the most famous opinion from
Katz,86 a concurring opinion in Jones has prompted additional dialogue
about the third-party doctrine. Justice Sotomayor agrees with the plurality
that there was a trespass on the defendant’s car, and based her holding on
that principle.87 However, she also discusses the two lines of privacy doc-
trine that exist today: the historical trespass reasoning (which the majority
used in Jones to maintain the doctrine of constitutional avoidance88), and the
Katz idea of a reasonable expectation of privacy that contributed to the de-
velopment of the mosaic theory as a tool to determine that expectation.89
Sotomayor’s concurrence, while not proposing a solution to the third-party
doctrine’s applicability to a modern era, reinforces the concern that wide-
spread, available, and cheap electronic surveillance could chill “associa-
tional and expressive freedoms” by revealing large amounts of data about
those under surveillance.90
Another concurring opinion, authored by Justice Alito, focuses solely on
the reasonable expectation of privacy test, and even goes as far as to assert
that the majority is “hard-pressed to find support in post-Katz cases for its
trespass-based theory.”91 Justice Alito’s concurrence highlights the inconsis-
tency of the trespass theory, noting that under such a theory, briefly tracking
a car using GPS surveillance would not be allowed under the Fourth Amend-
ment, but following that same car for weeks using unmarked law enforce-
82. Id. at 954 (“It may be that achieving the same result [as traditional surveillance]
through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion
of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question.”) (emphasis
added).
83. Id. at 948.
84. See id. at 949; see also, id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 952 (“But as we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”).
86. See supra note 33.
87. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955.
88. Id. at 954 (“and answering it leads us into additional thorny problems.”).
89. Id. at 956.
90. Id. at 957 (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to
third parties.”).
91. Id. at 961.
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ment vehicles and aerial surveillance would be constitutional.92 Justice
Alito’s opinion echoes the lower court’s mosaic theory-based decision in
Maynard93 that warrantless, extended law enforcement surveillance violates
the Fourth Amendment when the length of the surveillance goes beyond
what people would reasonably expect.94
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
Unlike when ECPA was passed in 1986, now almost 90 percent of
Americans own some sort of computerized technology95 and many of them
share personal information through cell phones, e-mail, social media and
web-based applications. The ubiquity of technologies that permit informa-
tion sharing is one of the major arguments against the third-party doctrine.96
Critics say the traditional third-party doctrine, which looks at a combination
of reasonable expectations and physical trespass, is ill-suited for a society
where information can be easily obtained without any physical trespass, and
where new technology and current events are constantly reshaping expecta-
tions of privacy.97 Because the traditional doctrine clashes with modern soci-
ety, some critics propose doing away with the third-party doctrine entirely,
forcing law enforcement officers to always seek a warrant to get this infor-
mation. These critics fail to take into account the public safety interest in
giving law enforcement the necessary tools, and support their criticisms with
misguided notions about privacy or the role of federal law enforcement.
When criminals avail themselves of the benefits of third-party assis-
tance, they should not receive the same amount of privacy that criminals
acting alone receive.98 Most law enforcement investigations are based on the
two-step investigatory scheme that has been established and developed
through Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This scheme starts with less in-
vasive, open surveillance techniques, followed by more invasive steps that
require law enforcement to make certain showings (such as the probable
92. Id.
93. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
94. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964. It is also worth mentioning that one criticism of using
the Katz test is that society’s reasonable expectation of privacy can be manipulated by govern-
ment policies that elevate national paranoia; see Ghoshray, supra note 10, at 62–63 (mention-
ing specifically the Patriot Act legislation passed after 9/11 that used the heightened sense of
fear to pass laws infringing more on citizens’ privacy).
95. See Peters, supra note 64, at 118–20; see also, Dennis, supra note 3, at n.20.
96. See, THOMPSON II, supra note 6, at 2 (“[T]he third-party doctrine has been criticized
by Members of Congress, various commentators and others as overly constrictive of Ameri-
cans’ privacy rights . . . .”).
97. See Ghoshray, supra note 10, at 63; see also infra note 112 (regarding current
events that have shaped expectations of privacy).
98. Kerr, supra note 2, at 573–75 (explaining the substitution effects that criminals ex-
perience when using third parties, by replacing the criminal’s public actions with a third
party’s actions).
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cause required for a search warrant).99 If the third-party doctrine is eradi-
cated and criminals are able to use third parties to conduct entire criminal
acts, law enforcement agencies will lose some of their most basic investiga-
tive abilities.100 Third parties that would have previously met in public, or
could be observed leaving a subject’s house, can now be e-mailed from a
basement, entirely out of sight of law enforcement officers.101 The traditional
open surveillance techniques are no longer effective. Even if officers have
reasons to investigate a subject further, they are hamstrung by a technologi-
cally-advanced world that puts physical surveillance out of reach and, for
example, allows child pornography to be shared across the world without a
subject ever leaving home.
Some critics of the third-party doctrine argue that privacy is an all-or-
nothing concept.102 This concept posits that once a person (or government
entity) has access to the information, the information is essentially public
knowledge—phone numbers and call times identified by police could be
discovered by the subject’s employer or spouse. This argument fails to con-
sider the secrecy involved in most investigations at this stage, and fails to
consider that the third parties receiving the information (such as phone com-
panies and ISPs) have a commercial interest in protecting customer informa-
tion.103 While a limited business purpose does not shield a bank from
disclosing information to the government, banks have a very high commer-
cial interest in protecting client information. In fact, companies who have
suffered recent breaches of privacy have responded to declining stock prices
by spending additional money on public relations to assure customers of
their security, and guaranteeing credit monitoring for customers.104 Compa-
99. Id. at 574.
100. Id. at 576 (“He [a criminal] could use third parties to create a bubble of Fourth
Amendment protection around the entirety of his criminal activity.”).
101. See Stephen Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L.
REV. BULL. 39, 44–45 (2011) (“[I]t is true than any protective doctrine permits ‘savvy wrong-
doers’ to hide portions of their crime from public observation.”) Henderson goes on to analo-
gize shopping at a bookstore as opposed to buying a book online with committing a crime, but
fails to note the interest that people have in keeping that information private. While customers
may find the convenience of online book shopping worth the disclosure of payment and
purchase information, criminals are likely to be far more cautious about what information they
are disclosing to anyone.
102. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 571; but cf. THOMPSON II, supra note 6, at 17 (asserting
that people also criticize the third-party doctrine for seeing privacy as an all-or-nothing idea).
103. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 598–99; see also Joseph Pomianowski and Jane Chong, In
Order to Protect Users From Intrusive Governments, Apple has Prevented Itself from Unlock-
ing iOs 8 Devices, FORBES OPINION BLOG (Oct. 16, 2014) http://www.forbes.com/sites/real-
spin/2014/10/16/in-order-to-protect-users-from-repressive-governments-apple-has-prevented-
itself-from-unlocking-ios-8-devices. But cf. Kerr, supra note 2, at 600 (noting that some com-
panies (especially telecommunications companies) have come under fire for voluntarily assist-
ing the government (the NSA) in actions that likely violated privacy statutes).
104. Robin Sidel, Home Depot’s 56 Million Card Breach Bigger than Target’s, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 9, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/home-depot-breach-bigger-than-targets-
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nies, then, are likely to understand the value of maintaining customer
privacy.
Though companies can, and do, sell subscriber information to third par-
ties for advertising purposes,105 consumers can generally find out if a partic-
ular company does that before giving the company their business.106
While some critics rely on a misguided concept of complete privacy
loss, other critics pushing for repeal of the third-party doctrine look to state
law for support. Stephen Henderson, who wrote in support of completely
doing away with the third-party doctrine, substantiated his argument by cit-
ing a survey of state laws, showing that the doctrine is not popular at the
state level.107 This fails to take into account the legitimate needs of federal
law enforcement, which investigates and pursues larger and more serious
crimes and more sophisticated criminals and, for that reason, needs a larger
toolbox. While some criticism of the third-party doctrine has merit, critics
calling for its total repeal fail to consider the benefits to law enforcement
and, subsequently public safety, that result from the doctrine.
V. MODIFYING THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE TO REACH NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Keeping the third-party doctrine as it currently stands without modifica-
tion presents concerns about privacy in a modern world where personal in-
formation is frequently released to third parties.108 While doing away with
the doctrine completely has the appeal of easy administration, it poses a very
real threat to law enforcement investigations, as previously discussed. In-
stead, courts should maintain certain aspects of third-party jurisprudence,
while incorporating greater protection for information that is not turned over
willingly. There is a strong reliance argument in support of law enforcement
techniques that have developed around the third party, like allowing bank
records109 and pen registers110 to be released without a warrant, and these
established precedents should continue. The doctrine also fits in relatively
1411073571 (quoting a Home Depot estimate that the breach would cost the company $62
million).
105. See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 376 (“In fact, many businesses, including big-name
companies like Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, and Facebook, are financially successful, in part,
because of their ability to sell targeted advertising using user data.”).
106. For instance, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions to disclose
their information sharing policies to potential customers. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial
Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338 § 204 (1999).
107. Stephen Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How To Apply the Fourth
Amendment and its State Analogs to Protect Third-Party Information from Unreasonable
Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 376 (2006) (“This study reveals eleven states [in their state
constitutions] reject the third-party doctrine and ten others have given some reason to believe
that they might reject it.”).
108. See Peters, supra note 64, at 118–19; see THOMPSON II, supra note 6; see also
Dennis, supra note 3, at n.20.
109. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
110. See Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735 (1979).
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neatly with general Fourth Amendment case law, supporting its continued
existence.
Society would also benefit from allowing law enforcement warrantless
access to information that is voluntarily and knowingly disclosed to a third
party. Voluntary disclosures to third parties using new technology should be
afforded no protection. On the other hand, information that is not affirma-
tively and voluntarily shared, yet is accessible by third parties as a result of
new technology, should be protected by the strongest form of Fourth
Amendment protection—a warrant requirement.
A. Proposed Standard of Voluntary Disclosure
Courts should consider the following factors to determine whether infor-
mation was voluntarily released: the reasonable expectation element that was
present in Katz; the purpose of the disclosure; the frequency of transmis-
sions; and the public access to the information.111
The standard of “voluntary disclosure” coheres with the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test, but also allows courts to consider factors other
than society’s reasonable expectation of privacy—something the average
judge may find difficult to ascertain and is likely to shift based on current
events.112 In addition to the reasonable expectation factor, courts can look at
the number of data transmissions to determine the intrusiveness of the scope
of the warrantless investigation. This factor brings the mosaic theory of
Maynard113 squarely into the court’s consideration. Whether some other
members of the public can access that data should also be taken into ac-
count—since that third-party presence forms the initial basis of the doctrine.
Instead of doing away with the third-party doctrine and requiring a search
warrant to look at a subject’s Facebook page that 800 of his closest “friends”
can already see, this test allows law enforcement agencies to access his sta-
tus updates through an evidentiary standard that is slightly easier to meet.114
A court should also consider the purpose of sharing the information.
While the Court in Miller115 rejected the idea of a limited purpose exclusion
111. See Matthew D. Lawless, The Third-Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records
and the Case for a “Crazy Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, 2007 UCLA J.L. & TECH.
1, 21–23 (2007) (regarding his “Operational Realities” test which focuses on who has the right
to view the information).
112. For example, cloud security came into the public sphere after hundreds of photos of
celebrities were released online after their iCloud accounts were hacked. See Justin Worland,
How That Massive Celebrity Hack Might Have Happened, TIME (Sept. 1, 2014) http://time
.com/3247717/jennifer-lawrence-hacked-icloud-leaked; see also, supra note 94 (regarding the
national climate after the 9/11 attacks).
113. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
114. This factor is similar to the test proposed by Matthew D. Lawless, which would
focus on who had a right to view the information and whether the parties agreed to and were
aware of the disclosure. See Lawless, supra note 111, at 1, 21–23.
115. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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to the doctrine, in a world where metadata runs rampant, the purpose of
sharing the information contributes to determining what data was voluntarily
and knowingly revealed. For example, a person uses FitBit to voluntarily
share the number of steps taken in a day, but any location information that
helped determine that number would remain shielded. So while bank cus-
tomers may expect that the bank will disclose information related to bank-
ing, they would not expect the bank to reveal their height or eye color—if a
bank for some reason chose to identify customers by those factors. In order
for the voluntary disclosure standard to be met, the disclosing parties need to
know what type of information they are releasing and take the chance that
the voluntarily released information could be shared.
This idea ties into the “assumption of risk” arguments used in earlier
cases116 and incorporates the more recent mosaic theory into a standard that
is easily administrable by courts and easily understood by citizens.117 Texts,
phone calls, and e-mails are released to ISPs, phone companies, and (in the
case of e-mails), the servers of the e-mail host. Like the pen register cases,
allowing law enforcement access to the non-content “envelope information”
at the lower statutory standard required for a court order should be
continued.118
Similar to the Katz test, a knowing, voluntarily release standard would
be based on peoples’ understanding (a reasonable expectation) of the disclo-
sure of information. Facebook statuses,119 online shopping orders, and inter-
action with a smartphone application, such as Google Maps or Spotify,
would be disclosures that are understood to be reviewed by a third party
(either automated or human review). However, cell site tracking location
that is periodically sent to the cellular company would not fall into this cate-
gory.120 Similarly, websites visited would not be considered voluntary dis-
closures to the ISP, under the reasonable expectation of privacy that most
116. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
117. For more on the assumption of risk idea, see Kerr, supra note 2 at 588 (asserting
that viewing the third-party doctrine as a consent doctrine helps clarify and reconcile the
cases).
118. This line of logic has been upheld by the 6th and 9th Circuits. See United States v.
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir.
2007).
119. For more on the third-party doctrine implications of Facebook, see Monu Bedi,
Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third-Party Doctrine Should not Apply, 54
B.C. L. REV. 1, 27 (2013).
120. Even if most cell customers are aware their smartphones track location data, they
generally have no control over the release of that information; see Orin Kerr, Eleventh Circuit,
disagreeing with the Fifth, holds Fourth Amendment protects cell-site records, WASHINGTON
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY BLOG (June 11, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/11/eleventh-circuit-disagreeing-with-the-fifth-holds-fourth-
amendment-protects-cell-site-records.
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people have in their Internet browsing habits,121 as well as the mosaic theory
proposed in Maynard and discussed in Jones.
In addition to the reasonable expectation element, courts should con-
sider the frequency of transmissions and the public access to the information
(e.g., whether the average person could access this information or whether
this information would only be available through a subpoena).122 The addi-
tion of these more concrete factors assuages some of Justice Alito’s concerns
about subjectivity and circularity that he expressed in the Jones
concurrence.123
B. Application of Proposed Standard to Modern Technology
Facebook and social media fall on the disclosure end of the third-party
spectrum. Participants knowingly and willingly share information with
others. The transmission is directed entirely by the person sharing the infor-
mation; that person dictates the frequency of transmissions.124 Orin Kerr,
who has written at length about the third-party doctrine, highlighted this idea
of knowingly transmitting data, stating that “courts should assume that users
of a technology understand the technology. . . [t]he Constitution shouldn’t
safeguard ignorance.”125 This bar for technological “ignorance” is likely get-
ting higher every year, as more people use new technologies and see how
these tools can be misused.126
121. One aspect of this expectation of privacy comes from the fact that much Internet
usage happens in one’s home. As seen in the development of Fourth Amendment cases, and
the fact that the Third Amendment explicitly protects the home, there is both Constitutional
and case law support for shielding the activities taking place in one’s home; but cf. Kerr, supra
note 2 (about a criminal who conducts all crime from home—however that level of interaction
would require more than passively browsing websites—it would require the type of voluntary
information disclosure that this paper asserts should be fair game for law enforcement officers
under the third-party doctrine.).
122. See Lawless, supra note 114 (regarding his “Operational Realities” test which fo-
cuses on who has the right to view the information).
123. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (“The Katz expectation-of-pri-
vacy test avoids the problems and complications noted above, but it is not without its own
difficulties. It involves a degree of circularity. . .and judges are apt to confuse their own expec-
tations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test
looks.”) (internal citations omitted).
124. E.g., the number of Facebook statuses created, or the average number of tweets per
day.
125. Orin Kerr, Cell Phones, Magic Boxes and the Fourth Amendment, VOLOKH CON-
SPIRACY (Nov. 8, 2010), http://volokh.com/2010/11/08/cell-phones-magic-boxes-and-the-
fourth-amendment/.
126. E.g., Biana Bosker, The Twitter Type that Exposed Anthony Weiner, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 7, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/07/anthony-weiner-twitter-dm_
n_872590.html (explaining Weiner’s mistaken direct message that was published as a public
tweet); see Sidel, supra note 104 (regarding credit card breaches); see also Worland, supra
note 112.
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On the other end of the voluntary disclosure spectrum, some releases of
information would not count as disclosure, e.g., location information trans-
mitted from a FitBit. A FitBit tracks steps, counts calories burned, and
monitors sleeping habits. Consumers purchase the device to monitor their
health, and indeed, while the device records location data, consumers are not
using a FitBit for that purpose and may not even be aware of the location
data function. The users, then, have a reasonable expectation that any terti-
ary location data used to calculate the number of steps they took is safe from
government seizure. There is also the concern about the frequency with
which FitBit data is transmitted. The device automatically backs up to a
computer or mobile device every twenty minutes if it can connect to wireless
Internet.127 However, FitBit does allow users to “friend” other FitBit users
and it allows data to be shared with third parties.128 So information broad-
casted to FitBit friends would fall under the third-party doctrine, while the
minute-by-minute data and daily totals that are stored on the device would
not be accessible without a search warrant.
Of course people share information with technology in ways that are
less clear than the previous two examples. Venmo and ApplePay are two
different applications that both allow their users to pay other people. How-
ever, they operate in very different realms. Venmo is a social payment me-
dium where users can find their friends, make payments public and add
cheeky descriptions of payments that other users can “like.”129 ApplePay
presents itself as a payment method that is more secure than credit cards
because Apple uses a tokenized, random account number for each credit
card, so the actual credit card number is not even shared with the retailer.130
While a traditional credit card transaction involves revealing the credit card
number to the cashier, and possibly to anyone within eyeshot of the card,
Apple markets its payments as far more private.131 By contrast, Venmo users
understand the social aspect of their payments, appreciating that the informa-
tion is revealed publically to their friends and other users of the app. A
Venmo payment would fall squarely within the kind of disclosures subject to
the third-party doctrine, whereas an ApplePay transaction would not.
127. Help Article: How do I get data from my tracker to the website?, FITBIT HELP, http://
help.fitbit.com/articles/en_US/Help_article/How-do-I-get-data-from-my-tracker-to-the-web-
site/?l=en_US&fs=RelatedArticle (last updated Jan. 8, 2015).
128. Help Article: 3rd Party Integration, FITBIT HELP, http://help.fitbit.com/?l=en_US&c
=Topics%3AX3rd_Party_Integration (last visited March 27, 2015).
129. John Patrick Pullen, You Asked: What is Venmo?, TIME (Dec. 15, 2014), http://time
.com/3632048/you-asked-what-is-venmo/.
130. H.O. Maycotte, Sorry Walmart-NFC and Apple Pay have Already Won, FORBES
(Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/homaycotte/2014/11/04/nfc-apple-pay-already-
won/.
131. Id. (“Because Apple doesn’t store the credit card information, it is never shared with
the merchant. So if a retailer’s system is breached, the hackers won’t have access to a user’s
financial information.”).
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While looking up directions using MapQuest on a computer is simple
web browsing, which would be protected from law enforcement requests,
using a mapping application like Google Maps on a smartphone transmits
real time location information to Google. Users see the dot corresponding to
their location move as they move, and have turned over this location infor-
mation for the purpose of orienting themselves. Unlike the FitBit informa-
tion, or regular cell phone data transfers, as seen at issue in Davis,132 the
smartphone users’ location directly correlates to their purpose in sending this
information to a third party. While the volume of transmissions is large,
users are clearly aware that their location information is being used by a
third party to convenience them.
C. Alternative Proposals
Scholars and practitioners have suggested other limits to the third-party
doctrine. Many of these suggestions incorporate the same general ideas of
the voluntary disclosure standard, but present other issues that make them
undesirable options.
One suggestion is based on the automation, as opposed to human ob-
server, distinction, mentioned briefly in the Smith opinion.133 Championed
by Matthew Tokson, this theory holds that since the machines processing
most electronic information lack the ability to actually understand the con-
tent of the information, privacy is not lost when information is voluntarily
disclosed to machines.134 Under this proposal, information released to a third
party would maintain its privacy if that third party used an automated pro-
cess to collect and analyze the information.135
From an administrative perspective, this argument fails to address that
businesses would have to develop a uniform procedure for receiving and
analyzing data. As to the subjective reasonable expectations side of the
equation, consumers would have to generally be aware of that procedure and
know which companies use automated review as opposed to occasional
human review to understand which information could be turned over to the
government and which information is protected. However under this justifi-
cation, the government could theoretically run automated searches of docu-
ments and communications without even a court order.136 The administrative
132. U.S. v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014).
133. See Tokson, supra note 59.
134. Bedi, supra note 119, at 19–20 (citing Tokson, supra note 59); see also, Henderson,
supra note 101, at 46.
135. See Henderson, supra note 101, at 47–48 (noting that automation feeds into con-
sumers’ opinions of how invasive an act feels.) Like a reasonable expectation of privacy,
survey respondents did not mind spam filters looking for certain words in the content of their
e-mails, but were more disturbed by targeted advertising based on similar automated e-mail
reviews.
136. Henderson, supra note 101, at 48.
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costs and practical consequences of such a regime would outweigh the bene-
fits of what may or may not be additional privacy.137
The voluntary disclosure standard incorporates some of the ideas behind
the automation principle, but in a more administrable format—as it relies on
reasonable expectations of society, and not on how a particular website was
reviewing traffic that week.
One critique of the use of voluntariness as a standard for the third-party
doctrine is the idea that citizens “volunteer” this information ignores the
realities of a world where it is difficult to function without disclosing infor-
mation to third parties.138 Justice Marshall suggested this in his dissent in
Smith,139 and some critics have suggested that without voluntarily disclosing
information, today’s individual “will not be able to live in society.”140 This
hyperbolic statement seems to forget that many of the reasons people volun-
tarily disclose information is for convenience.141 Online banking doesn’t re-
quire waiting in line to talk to a teller, e-mail can be sent at any time of the
day, and writing a Facebook status may be the fastest way to disseminate life
updates to friends. But there are unquestionably people who live in society
without all, or any, of these conveniences.142 Admittedly, functioning in to-
day’s society without e-mail would be difficult, but many employers provide
e-mail addresses for their employees and, at an individual level, these em-
ployees lack an expectation of privacy when using the computers and e-mail
servers of their employers.143
Some proposed tests require courts to weigh numerous factors, and pre-
sent the same administrative difficulties seen in the automation standard.
One such test is a competing-interests test that considers the human/automa-
tion distinction as well as the disclosing individuals’ underlying autonomy
interest.144 In addition to administrative concerns, that test presents a concern
137. The amount of additional privacy each person receives would depend on the various
third parties they are giving information to, and how intimate they consider that information. A
bank may use human review, opening that information up to the government, while a third-
party advertiser may use an automated system for cataloging users, shielding a customer’s e-
mail address from law enforcement.
138. Orin Kerr, Eleventh Circuit, disagreeing with the Fifth, holds Fourth Amendment
protects cell-site records, WASHINGTON POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY BLOG (June 11, 2014)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/11/eleventh-circuit-dis-
agreeing-with-the-fifth-holds-fourth-amendment-protects-cell-site-records.
139. Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 751–52 (1979).
140. Ghoshray, supra note 10, at 73–74.
141. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (“New technology may provide
increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the
tradeoff worthwhile.”).
142. See Bedi, supra note 119, at 1, 27.
143. Employers often have an established preservation system and may search through e-
mails for specific terms, or just monitor generally.
144. See Elsbeth Brotherton, Big Brother Gets a Makeover: Behavioral Targeting and
the Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555 (2012).
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about horizontal inequity as it requires courts to determine on a case-by-case
basis whether the third party’s interests prevail over the individuals, while
also factoring in the government’s interests.145
Some courts and theorists have introduced the idea of ISPs as a “mere
conduit” of the information, and therefore not considered an actual third
party to the content of the e-mail.146 The voluntary disclosure standard incor-
porates that idea, without having to deal with the same practical concerns of
notice that the automation standard presents.147 Some supporters of the third-
party doctrine argue support for similar ideas by likening modern technology
to what “old fashioned” criminals would have done.148 Instead of sending an
e-mail to a friend asking to borrow a shovel, the criminal would have had to
leave her house and could have been seen by neighbors, possibly security
cameras, and maybe even a police officer. Instead of actively stalking a vic-
tim, a criminal may resort to cyber-stalking to identify their victim’s loca-
tion. This analogizing, while creative, is unnecessary. It is difficult to
imagine a court easily engaging in such analogizing or defending the chosen
analogy against equally valid alternatives, and furthermore, analogizing
every possible technological change to actions taken without technology
only muddies the assertion that the doctrine needs to adapt to a society
where information is regularly shared with third parties.
As shown with ECPA, Congress is capable of passing laws that protect
individuals’ electronic communications.149 Ultimately, Congress can speak
again if it finds the Court has failed to strike the appropriate balance between
individual privacy concerns and law enforcement interests either by amend-
ing ECPA to require a warrant or passing a similar law that grants more
protection to electronic information disclosed to third parties.
CONCLUSION
The third-party doctrine should be modified to better align with modern
technology and information sharing, and to achieve this, courts should mod-
145. Id. at 592–95.
146. Most notably, Stephen Henderson’s idea of a “limited third-party doctrine.” See
Henderson, supra note 101. However, Henderson only mentions this idea and then proposes to
eliminate the doctrine entirely.
147. E.g., concern that citizens would have to know which entities count as third parties,
and which count as mere conduits; just as they would have to know the methodology by which
an entity processes its data.
148. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 577–79.
149. Congress has also stepped in to protect financial records (post-Miller) with the
Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA), and acts like HIPAA, which place additional protec-
tions on customer information. For more examples of Congressional action taken to narrow the
third-party doctrine, see Kerr, supra note 2, at 596–97. This is by no means a novel idea, as
Chief Justice Taft wrote in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465–66 (1928) (“Con-
gress may, of course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when inter-
cepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart
from the common law of evidence.”).
Spring 2015] Voluntary Disclosure of Information 423
ify the standard used when determining which information loses Fourth
Amendment protection. Limiting the third-party doctrine to information that
is voluntarily disclosed maintains the protection of intimate data that citizens
may not even realize is being collected, but still allows law enforcement
officers to conduct preliminary investigations when they lack the probable
cause required for a warrant. This standard fits in with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, preserves well-established doctrinal concepts, and does not
require a complete rebooting of law enforcement training and techniques.
Instead, it grants citizens increased privacy and leaves open the option for
Congress to take additional action, if needed.
